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Abstract With the development of cloud computing, electronic health record
(EHR) system has appeared in the form of patient-centric, in which patients
store their personal health records (PHRs) at a remote cloud server and selec-
tively share them with physicians for convenient medical care. Although the
newly emerged form has many advantages over traditional client-server model,
it inevitably introduces patients' concerns on the privacy of their PHRs due to
the fact that cloud servers are very likely to be in a dierent trusted domain
from that of the patients.
In this paper, aiming at allowing for ecient storing and sharing PHRs
and also eliminating patients' worries about PHR privacy, we design a secure
cloud-based EHR system, which guarantees security and privacy of medical
data stored in the cloud, relying on cryptographic primitive but not the full
trust over cloud servers. Based on our proposed basic EHR system, we provide
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several extensions including adding searchability, supporting revocation func-
tionality and enabling ecient local decryption, which lls the gap between
theoretical proposal and practical application.
Keywords Electronic health record  Attribute-based encryption  Cloud
computing
1 Introduction
Electronic health record (EHR) is an evolving concept dened as a system-
atic collection of electronic health information about individual patients or
populations. Compared with traditional paper-based health record, EHR has
many basic benets including being easily accessed and computerized, and the
elimination of poor penmanship, which has historically plagued the medical
chart [38][33]. Besides the basic benets, from the perspective of system level,
EHR system can also have particular functionalities which hold great promise
in improving the quality of care and reducing costs at the health care system
[29]. Due to the great advantages of EHR, the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 that was signed into
law as part of the \stimulus package" represents the largest US initiative to
date that is designed to encourage widespread use of EHRs.
Traditionally, health care system using EHRs (without loss of generality
we call it EHR system throughout this paper) was built in the client-server
model. Specically, this type of system stores data in house, requiring a server,
hardware and software to be installed in the physician's oce. With the recent
development of cloud computing [1], it greatly desires to migrate the patients'
data at the in-house servers to the cloud, which leads to the emergence of a
new type of EHR system, namely the cloud-based EHR system. Compared
with the traditional client-server setting, the cloud-based EHR system has
many great advantages, such as requiring simpler implementation and less IT
resources, reducing the cost of EHR installation, proving superior accessibility
and collaboration, providing better scalability, etc.
In tandem with the great use of cloud-based EHR system, it rises concerns
on the privacy over patients' personal health records (PHRs). Specically,
although it is believed that security in today's cloud-based applications is
generally improved than the security in traditional systems in the sense that
more resources can be devoted to solving security issues, unauthorized access to
sensitive data is one of the most critical concerns from cloud-based customers
(i.e., patients in our applications). Such a concern originates from the fact that
cloud servers are very likely to be in a dierent trusted domain from that of
the customers. It is thus hard to imagine that the patients would like to store
their PHRs on the cloud to selectively share with physicians for medical care.
In this paper, aiming at allowing for secure storing and sharing PHRs
and also making patients cancel worries about the privacy of their PHRs,
we design a secure cloud-based EHR system using attribute-based encryption
(ABE). The system allows the patients to share their PHRs with physicians
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selectively by encrypting the data using patients' symptoms of illness with-
out knowing the precise description of their illnesses or the departments of
physicians. In our proposed system, the actual PHR is encrypted with e-
cient symmetric key encryption, while the symmetric key is encapsulated with
ABE. This hybrid encryption paradigm will not sacrice the eciency of our
system too much. For key encapsulation, we use the threshold ABE [34] as un-
derlying primitive to enable the physician to access with false-tolerant, which
is realistic in practice. Then, based on the proposed basic EHR system, we
provide several extensions to make it allow for search, revocation and ecient
local decryption, which lls the gap between our system proposal and practical
application.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
works related to EHR and ABE. In Section 3, we provide the system model
and design goals for the cloud-based EHR system. In Section 4, we design
the basic EHR system. In Section 5, several extensions are added to the basic
EHR system based on practical requirements. Finally conclusion is drawn in
Section 6.
2 Related Work
2.1 Electronic Health Record System
The paper-based health records in use may generate an extensive paper trail.
There is consequently a great interest in moving from paper-based health
records to EHRs, and building new health care system with EHRs. Until now,
many standards have related the regulations that an EHR system should sat-
isfy. For example the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 which is the most frequently used regulation denes the pri-
vacy rules of USA health informatics. We suggest the readers refer to [10] for
other detailed regulations and standards.
Security and privacy play an important role in today's EHR system. Aim-
ing at allowing physicians to access patients' health data without disclos-
ing patients' personal data, the pseudo anonymity technique has been ap-
plied in several works [31][32][8]. Of these, [8] used an approach for reversible
pseudonym generation; [32] proposed the possibility of sharing pseudonyms
based on Shamir secret sharing [35]. Besides anonymize identity, many works
(e.g., [2][9][13][14][15] to list a few) suggested that EHR data should also be
encrypted in order to increase security.
Concerning on the deployment of EHR system in cloud, Li et al. [28] ad-
dressed the problem of authorized private keyword searches on encrypted
PHRs in cloud computing environment, and presented a scalable and ne-
grained authorization framework for this purpose. Haas et al. [13] and Zhang
et al. [40] considered that patients should not trust that the cloud service
provider cannot access their EHR data, particularly when the cloud service
provider is unrelated to patient or health institutions, and proposed crypto-
4 Fatos Xhafa et al.
graphic solutions. The work most related to ours is from Narayan et al. [30]
who proposed the use of ABE to ensure that the cloud service provider can-
not see (or copy) EHR data. Compared with our work, the previous work [30]
lacks of the consideration of the fault-tolerance and reducing local computa-
tion in decryption. In addition, Narayan et al.'s work [30] uses a public-key
searchable encryption [4] which involves computationally intensive operations
such as bilinear mappings and is not scalable. In this work, our searchability is
just based on lightweight pattern match and suitable for the EHR application
consisting of large number of PHRs.
2.2 Attribute-based Encryption
The notion of ABE, which was introduced as fuzzy identity-based encryption
in [34], was rstly dealt with by Goyal et al. [11]. Two dierent and comple-
mentary notions of ABE were dened as key-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE).
A construction of KP-ABE was provided in the same paper [11], while the
rst CP-APE construction supporting tree-based access structure in generic
group model is presented by Bethencourt et al. [3].
Subsequently, a number of variants of ABE schemes have been proposed
since its introduction. They range from extending its functionality to proposing
schemes with stronger security proofs. Such as ABE schemes supporting for
any kinds of access structures [7][37], ABE with multi-authorities [5][6][18],
full secure ABE [16][17][20], unbounded ABE [19], etc.
Recently, a novel outsourcing paradigm for ABE was provided for reduce
local computation [41][12][22] [23]. The common idea in these work is to uti-
lize secure outsourcing technique to delegate the overhead computation during
encryption/decryption/key-issuing to third party such that the local computa-
tion is minimized. In this paper we follow this outsourcing paradigm to realize
ecient local decryption.
3 Problem Statement
3.1 System Model
In this paper, we consider a cloud computing environment which hosts the
PHR service. Specically, as shown in Fig. 1 there are four entities involved in
this system.
{ Patient. It is an entity which creates its PHRs, and stores them at the
cloud server such that physicians equipped with professional capabilities
are able to access them.
{ Cloud Server. It is an entity which is responsible for storing patients' (en-
crypted) PHRs in a database and performing searches for the physicians.
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Fig. 1 Architecture for EHR System
{ Global Authority. It is an entity which is responsible for key management.
Specically, it generates keys for physicians of the system, and publishes
public parameters needed by cryptographic operations.
{ Physicians. It is an entity which can submit query to retrieve PHRs stored
at cloud server. More precisely, in this paper we consider the physicians to
be from the public domain, that is they are usually not personally known
by the patients. The physicians are able to obtain their private keys due
to their professional responsibilities, and need to access the PHRs for pro-
viding medical care.
Based on the system above, we then provide an overview of our proposed EHR
system.
{ System Setup: Public parameter and master secret key are initialized
for the system, and the global authority keeps the master secret key and
publishes the public parameters outside.
{ Physician Authorization: When a physician wants to join the system,
he/she has to apply for his/her private key at the authority according to
his/her professional responsibilities.
{ PHR Storage: When a patient wants to create and share his/her PHR
at the cloud server, he/she encrypts and sends the PHR to cloud server.
{ PHR Access:When a physician wants to access a PHR, he/she downloads
ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts it.
3.2 Adversary Model and Design Goals
In this paper, we assume the global authority is fully trusted, and consider a
\honest-but-curious" server which has been widely adopted in many existing
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works [36][24][25]. Specically, the cloud server will be \curious" for learning
the underlying meanings of the PHRs, but still honestly follow our proposed
protocols. Also, the cloud server could collude with some physicians to help
them derive additional information about patients' PHRs beyond physicians'
accessing scope.
Then, under the adversary model claried above, we attempt to address
the problem of building an ecient ne-grained access control EHR system in
the cloud environment. Specically, we allow the patient to enforce an access
policy on EHR according his/her disease which precisely designates the group
of physicians allowed to access the EHR. Also the cloud server is prevented
from learning the underlying meaning of the EHRs even if it colludes with
physicians not in the scope of the target EHRs. Besides this, we require that
all the goals should be achieved eciently in the sense that the EHR system
is scalable.
4 Basic EHR System
In this section, we will rstly introduce the background of ABE, and then
describe our design specication adapting to practical needs. Finally, the basic
EHR system as well as its security analysis are provided.
4.1 Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption has been widely applied to impose ne-grained
access control on encrypted data recently. There are two kinds of ABE hav-
ing been proposed: KP-ABE and CP-ABE. In KP-ABE, the access policy is
assigned in private key, whereas, in CP-ABE, it is specied in ciphertext.
Without loss of generality, we are able to denote (Ienc; Ikey) as the input
to encryption and key generation of ABE. Accordingly, in CP-ABE scheme,
(Ienc; Ikey) = (A; !) while that is (!;A) in KP-ABE, where ! and A are
attribute set and access structure, respectively. Then, an ABE scheme is con-
sisted of four algorithms below.
{ Setup() : The setup algorithm takes as input { a security parameter . It
outputs the public key pk and the master secret key msk.
{ KeyGen(Ikey;msk) : The key extraction algorithm takes as input { an ac-
cess structure (resp. attribute set) Ikey and the master secret key msk. It
outputs the user's private key sk.
{ Encrypt(m; Ienc) : The encryption algorithm takes as input { a message m
and the attribute set (resp. access structure) Ienc. It outputs the ciphertext
ct.
{ Decrypt(ct; sk) : The decryption algorithm takes as input { a ciphertext ct
which was assumed to be encrypted under the attribute set (resp. access
structure) Ienc and the private key sk for access structure (resp. attribute
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Name Age Sex Region Possible Illness Contact Information
Alice 65 female Boston heart disease XXX-XXX-XXXX
Bob 30 male New York XXX-XXX-XXXX
Lisa 45 female Washington DC XXX-XXX-XXXX
Table 1 An Example of PHR
set) Ikey. It outputs the messagem if (Ikey; Ienc) = 1 and the error symbol
? otherwise, where the predicate  is predened.
4.2 Design Specication
4.2.1 PHR Structure
In the EHR system, a patient's PHR describes detailed personal information
of him/her. Table. 1 illustrates an example of three personal information in
EHR for Alice. Note that the entry of possible illness can be let blank if the
patient does not know it properly.
In practice, a patient may want to share his/her record with a physician
familiar with his/her symptoms, but do not want to allow others to read any-
thing about personal information. Therefore, in our EHR system, we require
that PHR will be encrypted under the symptoms of patient's disease, which
potentially species the underlying physicians allowed to access patient's per-
sonal information.
4.2.2 Physician Attributes
The physicians' attributes, consisting of many kinds of symptoms of the dis-
eases that the physician is professional in, are obtained from the global author-
ity. For example, if a physician is professional in heart disease and has obtained
the qualication certicate for this disease, he/she can make an authentication
at authority with the certicate. The authority then assigns him with a private
key for the corresponding symptoms including heartache, shortness of breath,
dizziness and so on. Using this private key, the physician is able to later access
the PHRs within his/her scope.
4.2.3 Access Policy
Suppose all the symptoms of diseases constitute a universe U = fu1; u2; : : : ; ung
where ui indicates a symptom of disease such as heartache or dizziness (we
then will not distinguish the term of symptom and attribute used in the rest
of this paper). Then, each patient's disease and the professional abilities of
physician can be described as subsets of symptoms, that is !^  U and !  U
respectively.
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Next, we specify the policy for accessing PHRs. Recall that we use \symp-
toms" to describe both patient's disease and physician's professional abilities.
Intuitively, if an identical set of symptoms is owned by a patient and a physi-
cian, it has a signicant probability that the physician specializes in the pa-
tient's disease. It is advisable to allow such a physician to access this patient's
personal information and provide a rigorous treatment on his/her illness.
Besides the \exact match", we emphasize that we should add error-tolerance
property in our EHR system to allow for a private key (derived from a mea-
surement of a disease) to decrypt a PHR encrypted with a slightly dierent
measurement of the same disease. This is because the symptom-based mea-
surement for disease is noisy in both folds. On one side, we cannot always
require that the same disease is expressed in an identical set of symptoms.
For example the disease pneumonia appears in somebody in the symptoms
of headache and dry cough, but for others it may present with whole body
aches and having a fever. On the other side, an identical set of symptoms may
be derived from dierent disease. For example, a simple symptom of cough
could be the result of catching a cold, but it is also attributed to infecting
pneumonia.
Aiming at helping patient receive medical treatment as rigorous as possible,
while preventing others not professional in disease accessing the PHRs, we use
a threshold function shown below to measure whether a physician with ! can
access the PHR encrypted under !^ or not (1 indicates access is allowed while
0 otherwise), where d is the fault tolerance allowed.
(!^; !) =
(
1 j! \ !^j  d
0 j! \ !^j < d
4.3 System Description
Based on the design specication elaborated above, we then provide our basic
system in detail as follows. Note that in our system, we utilize the threshold
ABE [34] shown in Fig. 2 as underlying primitive.
System Setup: Suppose the attributes in universe U are taken from Zq.
Choose a security parameter  and run the procedure Setup() of underlying
ABE primitive to obtain the public key pk and the master secret keymsk. The
public key is then published, while the master key is kept by global authority
as a secret.
Physician Authorization: Assuming a new physician wants to join the EHR
system, he/she needs to be issued a private key for later accessing patients'
PHRs. In concrete, the physician provides the authority with his/her quali-
cation certicate for proving his/her specialized in a certain set of diseases.
The global authority then computes a set of symptoms ! which he/she is able
to professionally deal with. Finally the global authority runs KeyGen(!;msk)
and assigns the corresponding private key sk to this physician.
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Setup(1) : Select a generator g 2R G and an integer x 2R Zq , and set g1 = gx.
Then, pick elements g2; h1; : : : ; hn 2R G. Finally, output the public key pk =
(g; g1; g2; d; h1; : : : ; hn) and the master secret key msk = x.
KeyGen(!;msk) : Upon receiving a private key request on !, randomly pick a (d  
1)-degree polynomial poly() with poly(0) = msk. Then, for each attribute i 2 !,
compute di0 = g
poly(i)
2  (g1hi)ri and di1 = gri , where ri 2R Zq . Finally return sk =
(f(di0; di1)gi2!).
Encrypt(!^;m) : To encrypt a message m 2 G under !^, select an integer s 2R Zq . Then,
compute c0 = m  e(g1; g2)s, c1 = gs and ei = (g1hi)s for i 2 !^. Finally, publish the
ciphertext as ct = (!^; c0; c1; feigi2!^).
Decrypt(sk; ct) : Suppose that a ciphertext ct is encrypted under an attribute set !^
and physician is assigned with a private key sk for attribute set !, which satises
the restriction that (!^; !) = 1. Then, the decryption proceeds as follows. Firstly, an
arbitrary d-element subset set S  !^\! is selected. Then, the ciphertext is decrypted as
m =
Q
i2S e(c1;di0)
i;S(0)Q
i2S e(di1;ei)
i;S(0)
, where i;S(0) =
Q
j2S;j 6=i
 j
i j is the Lagrange polynomial
at zero point.
Fig. 2 Underlying ABE Primitive
PHR Storage: Whenever a patient suers from some illness, and wants to
upload his/her PHR to the cloud servers to call for medical help from physi-
cians. He/She rstly summarize his/her symptoms represented by !^ according
to the published parameters. For example, if a patient suers from heart dis-
ease, he/she may specify the symptoms \heartache", \shortness of breath"
and \dizziness" in !^. Note that all these symptoms are expressed in Zq. Then,
the patient randomly chooses a symmetric key k from the key space and en-
crypts the PHR f with k using standard symmetric key algorithm such as
AES. Later on, he/she runs the algorithm Encrypt(!^; k) and obtains the ci-
phertext ct which is the encryption of the symmetric key k with respect to the
access policy !^. Finally, the patient uploads the encrypted PHR ct as well as
the symptoms !^ to the cloud server.
PHR Access: Suppose a physician wants to access and retrieve PHRs of
his/her interests, he/she proceeds as follows: He/She rstly submits his/her
professional abilities expressed as a set of symptoms ! to the cloud server.
The cloud server then calculates and returns all the records (!^; ct) satisfying
j!^ \ !j  d. The physician nally runs Decrypt(sk; ct) and symmetric key
decryption to obtain the plain PHRs of patients, with which he/she can contact
the patients and provide medical treatment in time.
4.4 Security Analysis
Recall that two kinds of adversaries are considered, that is, 1) security against
external attackers (i.e., cloud server): The security denition for this kind of
attacker is captured by condentiality. It means that, given access to a set of
encrypted data, the external attackers, including the server, are not able to
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learn any partial information about the underlying PHRs; 2) security against
internal attackers (i.e., some \curious" physicians colluding with the cloud
server) : The security denition that is used to capture the internal attackers is
accessing PHRs not intended for them. It means that even if a set of \curious"
physicians collaborate together they still cannot access the encrypted PHRs
legal for none of them. Next, we analyze the security of our system in more
details.
Security Against External Adversaries. We need to prove that, given access
to a set of encrypted data, the external attackers are not able to learn any
partial information about the underlying les. Recall that the main external
adversary considered in this paper is the cloud server. For cloud servers, they
do not have attribute private keys on any attribute set, which means that
they cannot get any information of the secret key k used in the symmetric
encryption. Therefore, they are not able to decrypt and get any information
of the underlying PHRs if the symmetric encryption is secure.
Security Against Internal Adversaries. To protect the privacy of PHRs from
internal adversaries, an ABE scheme is utilized. Specically, to guarantee secu-
rity, it is required that even if a set of \curious" physicians (not in the sharing
scope of the PHRs) collude together they could not learn anything useful
from the encrypted PHRs. This coincides with the security goal of message
indistinguishability in ABE, which demands that user is unable to decrypt a
ciphertext if his/her attributes does not match the access policy. Based on
this analysis, the key point of the security against internal adversaries is the
underlying ABE primitive. Actually, this is naturally true due to the work
[34].
Based on the analysis above, we draw the conclusion that if the underlying
primitives ABE and symmetric key encryption are secure, our proposed EHR
system is secure in terms of the adversary model we consider in Section 3.2.
5 Extensions
In this section, based on our basic EHR system, we provide several extensions
to facilitate its practical utilization.
5.1 Adding Searchability
Note that one eciency bottleneck of our basic system is that it does not
support searchability at the cloud server. Specically, upon receiving physi-
cian's !, the cloud server has to scan all the stored PHRs, and nd out the
PHRs satisfying that the number of overlapped symptoms (i.e., the symptoms
associated with found PHR and physician's submitted symptoms) is beyond a
predened threshold value. In this case, the eciency cost at cloud server for
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a single time search is O(l) where l is the number of PHRs having been stored
at the cloud server.
Aiming at improving the searching eciency, we attempt to utilize the
fuzzy keyword search technique [27] and build a trie-based index for facilitate
the computation at cloud server. The challenge for this purpose is lling the
gap between fuzzy keyword search and the set overlaps decision (i.e., decide
whether the number of overlaps of two sets is beyond a specied value or not)
in this paper. More precisely, unlike the fuzzy keyword search, set has the
property that it does not have order and each member appears not more than
once, which results that we cannot impose the edit distance to determine the
overlaps of set.
In order to transform set overlaps decision to fuzzy keyword search, we
number each symptoms in universe from 1 to n, which allows us to express
each set as an n-length binary string: if a symptom belongs to a set, the
corresponding bit of this symptom is set to 1; otherwise set to 0. After this
operation, the problem of set overlap decision is reduced to examine whether
two binary strings both have 1 in at least d bits, where d is the predened
threshold value. It is slightly next to the fuzzy keyword search, but there still
exists a challenge that we cannot trivially use the edit distance here because 0
cannot take account. That means the fact that two sets ! and !^ simultaneously
do not have an identical item should not contribute for increasing the number
of overlaps.
To tackle this challenge, we use \template match". More precisely, we use
wildcard to generate a template set 
 of !, and use 
 for the search at
cloud server. For example, suppose the threshold d = 3 and the numbered
universe U = f1; 2; : : : ; 10g. A set ! = f1; 3; 7; 9g can be expressed as a 10-
length binary string \1010001010". It is clear that the sets !^ consisting any
three items in ! will match it (it means the physician with ! can success-
fully decrypt the ciphertext encrypted under !^). We build the template set

^ = f1?1???1???; 1?1?????1?; ??1???1?1?; 1?????1?1?g and use 
^ to perform
search with a trie-based index like [27], where ? is a wildcard symbol for match-
ing arbitrary bit (0 or 1). The improved stage of PHR storage and access is
described as follows.
PHR Storage: It is identical to the homonymic stage in Section 4.3 except
the cloud server builds an trie-based index for storing the symptom set for
each PHR. Specically, upon receiving (!^; ct), the cloud server parses !^ into
a n-length string 12 : : : v following the principle elaborated above where
i 2 f0; 1gn=v, and then runs Algorithm 1 to adaptively add this string into the
trie index T . Note that for reducing storage cost, we combine v bits together
stored at each node in trie.
PHR Access: Suppose a physician wants to access and retrieve PHRs of
his/her interests, he/she proceeds as follows: He/She rstly parses his/her
professional abilities expressed as a set ! of symptoms into the template set 
^
and then submits 
^ to the cloud server. The cloud server runs an algorithm
of SearchTree to nd out all the encrypted PHRs, of which the associated
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Algorithm 1: Trie Update
Procedure TrieUpdate(T ; 12 : : : v ; P )
Input: trie T
binary string 12 : : : v
pointer P pointing to the encrypted PHR
Output: updated trie T
begin
set current node as root of T ;
for i 1 to v do
if there exists a child node of current node containing i then
set this child node as ;
else
create a new child node  containing i;
end
set  as current node;
end
append P with current node;
return T ;
end
symptoms set ! matches 
^. The key idea behind this algorithm is that all
sets may have overlaps if their corresponding strings share a common prex.
Then, then all the sets matching 
^ can be found with a depth-rst search of the
trie-based index. Since the Search algorithm used is similar to that in [26], we
omit it here and suggest the readers to refer [26] for formal description of this
algorithm. After utilizing the search algorithm based on trie and collecting all
the !^ satisfying j!^\!j  d, the cloud server continues to read its corresponding
encrypted PHR ct and returns the result f(!^; ct)gj!^\!jd back to physician.
Then the following workow is the same to that in Section 4.3.
5.2 Physician Revocation
Besides the searchability, another functionality needed to be supported by our
EHR system is physician revocation. For example, if the certicate of physician
authenticated has been out of date, it desires an ecient and secure way for
global authority to revoke the decryptabilities of these physicians.
For this purpose, we will utilize the idea of \updating attribute public key"
[39] to achieve physician revocation. Generally, this idea works by updating
the public keys of the attributes associated with revoked physicians, such that
they cannot utilize their private keys generated from the previous attribute
public keys to perform decryption. We then provide the details for physician
revocation in our setting as follows.
Physician Revocation: Whenever the global authority nds that a physi-
cian it manages has an overdue certicate, then it attempts to revoke the
decryptability of this physician. To achieve this goal, the following steps are
proceeded.
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{ The global authority rstly denes a minimal set of attributes S such that
all the attributes of the physicians to be revoked exist in S. Next, the
it attempts to update all the attribute public keys corresponding to the
attributes in S. This work is done by running the PubUpdate algorithm
of underlying ABE primitive shown in Fig. 3 to obtain pknew, rk and
msknew
1. We emphasize that the ABE primitive used here is a bit dierent
from which we elaborate in Fig. 2. Specically, 1) The attribute public keys
h1; h2; : : : ; hn are required to be selected as h1 = g
t1 ; h2 = g
t2 ; : : : ; hn = g
tn
where t1; t2; : : : ; tn 2R Zq. Since ti are random values, this change will not
aect the randomness of hi; 2) The master secret key used here is described
as msk = (x; t1; t2; : : : ; tn). The authority continues to publish pknew as a
new version of public key and sending the re-encryption key rk and S to
cloud server.
{ The cloud server then re-encrypts the \aected" ciphertext (i.e., are en-
crypted with attributes involving in S) with the re-encryption key. Specif-
ically, for each \aected" ciphertext ctold, it runs ReEncrypt(ctold; rk) to
get the updated ciphertext ctnew.
{ Meanwhile, the the other \aected" physicians (i.e., share attributes with
the revoked physicians) should request for the newest version of private
keys. Specically, they take their private keys in old version to authority
for key-update. The global authority then re-issues private keys to them
through running KeyGen with the newest version of public keys.
Remark: During the procedure of revocation, one of the eciency bottleneck
is at the authority. Specically, it has to re-issue private keys to all the other
\aected" physicians, which introduces an overhead computation at authority.
This issue can be xed by using outsourced key-issuing protocol and delegating
the attribute-related computation to other cloud service provider [21]. With
this technique [21], during a single re-issuing of private key, the authority just
needs to nearly three single-based modular exponentiations at local, and its
complexity is minimized.
5.3 Reducing Physician's Local Computations
The nal observation is the computation at physician sides. Specically, as
the popularity of mobile computing, typically in practice the physician may
use mobile device to query the cloud server and be returned with a number
of encrypted PHRs matching him/her, which requires a large computation for
complete decryption. Even if today's mobile device has theoretically provided
computing resources not weaker than personal computers, it will consume
a lot battery power, which still does not suggest imposing large overhead
computation at mobile devices. In this case, one choice is to temporarily store
the encrypted PHRs at mobile devices and transfer them to computer for
1 For simplicity, we just re-publish the attribute public key component in PubUpdate
because the other components are not be changed.
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PubUpdate(pkold;S;mskold) : To update all the attribute public keys corresponding to
the attributes in S, the authority uses the old master secret key mskold = (x; ftigi2U )
to proceed as follows. For each i 2 U , it computes h0i = h
t0i=ti
i where t
0
i 2R Zq if
i 2 S, and sets h0i = hi and t0i = ti if i =2 S. Finally output the updated public
keys pknew = (fh0igi2U ), re-encryption key rk = (f
x+t0i
x+ti
gi2U ) and keep the adaptively
updated master secret key msknew = (x; ft0igi2U ) local.
ReEncrypt(ct; rk) : In order to transform a ciphertext encrypted with an old version of
public keys to that under the current public keys, the cloud server computes e0i = e
x+t0i
x+ti
i
for all the i 2 !^, c01 = c1 and c00 = c0. Finally the ciphertext is updated as ctnew =
(c00; c
0
1; fe0igi2!^).
Fig. 3 Algorithms for Physician Revocation
decryption when come back home. But this will result in delay for medical
treatment, possibly aecting the life risk of patients. Therefore, it desires a
secure way for physicians to eciently and immediately decrypt a large number
of encrypted PHRs even if they are with resource-constrained devices like
mobile devices. As with the remark in the previous, we attempt to resolve this
issue with outsourcing computation.
Suppose there exists an additional entity namely decryption cloud ser-
vice provider (D-CSP) which works for facilitating physicians with resource-
constrained devices do a large number of decryptions. Actually, such type of
service provider is common in today's cloud computing such as Amazon EC2.
Generally, there are two alternatives for secure delegating decryption: one
is based on blinding private keys [12] and the other is to introduce a trivial
attribute and use it to control local decryption [21]. In this paper, we just
focus the former technique and attempt to extend it to our setting for facilitate
physicians' decryption.
In the outsourced decryption workow, at a high level, after authorization,
physicians with attributes 
 can compute his/her blinded private key fsk with
a randomly picked blinding factor t, and deliver fsk to the newly introduced
D-CSP to be stored. Then, after receiving the ciphertext from cloud server,
the physician directly forwards the result to D-CSP which uses his/her cor-
responding fsk to compute the partially decrypted ciphertext (compared with
the nal plaintext in our setting, it is blinded by the factor t). The physicians
then completely this type of ciphertext with his/her t. Then nal improved
stages for physician authorization and PHRs access are described as follows.
Physician Authorization: This stage works the same as that elaborated
in Section 4.3 except a key-blinding procedure is required. Specically, after
receiving the sk from the global authority, the physician continues to run the
algorithm shown in Fig. 4 to exponentially blind his/her private key with t,
and forwards and stores fsk at D-CSP for future decryption. The nal private
key includes sk issued by authority and the blinding factor t, and we will abuse
it as sk as well in our following elaboration.
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KeyBlind(sk) : Upon receiving a private key sk = (fdi0; di1gi2!) generated from the
authority, physician picks t 2R Zq and computes d0i0 = dti0 and d0i1 = dti1 for each i 2 !.
Finally outputfsk = (fd0i0; d0i1gi2!) and the redened private key sk = (fdi0; di1gi2! ; t)
Decryptout(
fsk; ct) : Suppose that a ciphertext ct = (c0; c1; feigi2!^) is encrypted under
an attribute set !^ and D-CSP is assigned with a blinded private key fsk for attribute
set !, which satises the restriction that (!^; !) = 1. Then, D-CSP proceeds as follows.
Firstly, an arbitrary d-element subset set S  !^ \ ! is selected. Then, the partial
decryption is computed as c00 =
Q
i2S e(c1;d
0
i0)
i;S(0)Q
i2S e(d0i1;ei)
i;S(0)
= e(g1; g2)st. Finally D-CSP
returns ct0 = (c0; c00).
Decrypt(sk; ct0) : . Upon receiving the partially decrypted ciphertext ct0 from D-CSP,
physician computes c0=(c00)
1=t = m.
Fig. 4 Algorithms for Reducing Computation for Physicians
PHRsAccess: Instead of directly decrypting ciphertext by themselves, the
physicians rstly forward the searched encrypted PHRs to D-CSP (for simplic-
ity our description starts from receiving the results and we omit the workow
of search which is detailedly elaborated in the same stage shown in Section
5.1). The D-CSP reads the corresponding stored fsk for this physician and
runs the outsourced decryption algorithm Decryptout shown in Fig. 4 for each
forwarded ciphertext. After performing partial decryption, D-CSP then sends
all the partially decrypted ciphertexts to the physician, which runs the local
decryption algorithm Decrypt on each of them to obtain symmetric key. With
these keys, physician nally does the symmetric decryption and get the plain
PHRs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, aiming at allowing for ecient storing and sharing PHRs in
today's cloud computing, we design a secure cloud-based EHR system using
ABE. Our system allows the patients to selectively share their PHRs with
physicians by performing encryption under their current symptoms but with-
out knowing the precise description of their illnesses or the departments of
physicians needed in medical treatment. Furthermore, in order to ll the gap
between theoretical proposal and practical application, we provide three ex-
tensions including adding searchability, supporting physician revocation func-
tionality, allowing for ecient local decryption, on our basic EHR system.
We believe our nal system meets the practical requirements in today's EHR
service.
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